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OPINION 
____________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Petitioner Igor Rodov has been admitted to the United 
States as a lawful permanent resident, and he would like to 
remain here.  The government wants to remove him from the 
country, citing his conviction for aiding and abetting a wire 
fraud scheme that cost its victims more than $120,000.  The 
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Board of Immigration Appeals sided with the government, and 
Rodov seeks review in this court. 
I 
 Rodov (who identifies himself by name throughout his 
unsealed court filings, notwithstanding the desire for anonymity 
suggested by the case caption) was first admitted to the United 
States in 1998 as a refugee from Belarus, where he had been 
threatened by anti-Semitism.  He became a lawful permanent 
resident in 2001.  In 2007, he returned to the States from a trip 
abroad, only to discover that he was subject to an arrest warrant 
arising out of his association with a wire fraud scheme.  The 
government released him into the country, but did not formally 
“admit” him.  Rather, the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) purported to “parole” him into the country, pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), for the purpose of prosecuting him. 
 The investigation into Rodov’s criminal activities 
eventually resulted in a plea agreement.  Rodov waived his right 
to an indictment; a one-count information filed in the United 
States District Court for the District of Connecticut charged him 
with aiding and abetting wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 
2 and 1343.  He pled guilty on February 29, 2008.  The plea 
agreement (supplemented by an attached “Stipulation of Offense 
Conduct”) set out the particulars of his crime:  Between January 
and November of 2006, Rodov opened several bank accounts in 
his own name.  A third party (identified only as “John Doe”) 
then proceeded to deposit fraudulently obtained tax refunds in 
Rodov’s accounts.  Rodov admitted that he had reason to believe 
that the funds were of criminal origin, and that he had 
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knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the wire fraud.  
Both the information and the stipulation identify a single use of 
the interstate wires in furtherance of the scheme:  On June 16, 
2006, John Doe knowingly caused a $6,447 tax refund to be 
wired into Rodov’s Bank of America account.  The stipulation 
goes on to state that “the loss amount attributable to the 
defendant through his participation in the aforementioned 
scheme and artifice to defraud was more than $120,000, but less 
than $200,000.”  Following entry of Rodov’s guilty plea, Judge 
Burns sentenced him to 12 months’ incarceration and three 
years’ supervised release, and ordered him to pay $208,214 in 
restitution. 
 DHS thereafter initiated removal proceedings.  According 
to the government, Rodov is an alien seeking admission into the 
United States, and his conviction of a “crime involving moral 
turpitude” precludes such admission.  See 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  Rodov responded by asserting that he is 
not, in fact, an applicant for admission (but is, rather, a lawful 
permanent resident entitled to admission); that cancellation of 
his removal is warranted under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b; and that the 
Convention Against Torture (CAT) bars the government from 
forcing him to return to Belarus.  The government replied that 
because Rodov has committed a crime involving moral 
turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) directs that he be treated 
as an applicant for admission notwithstanding his permanent 
resident status; that his crime is an “aggravated felony” that 
renders him ineligible for § 1229b cancellation; and that Rodov 
cannot meet the requisites for relief under the CAT. 
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The immigration judge agreed with Rodov.  The court 
first ruled that Rodov’s crime is not an aggravated felony, 
because the information and plea agreement refer only to a 
single transaction that caused a loss of less than $10,000.  See 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).  In a subsequent decision, the judge 
“note[d]” that Rodov was an arriving alien and concluded that 
he was removable on account of his conviction.  The court 
nevertheless cancelled Rodov’s removal, pursuant to § 1229b(a), 
after concluding that the balance of various factors weighed in 
his favor.  The court then, “[a]s an aside,” stated that if it had 
needed to reach Rodov’s arguments for asylum and relief under 
the CAT, it would have rejected them. 
The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed.  It held that 
the assessment of whether Rodov’s felony was aggravated 
depends not on the single $6,447 transfer but instead on the 
stipulated total loss of more than $120,000.  From this it 
followed that Rodov had in fact committed an aggravated 
felony, and thus that his removal could not be cancelled under § 
1229b.  The Board then stated that Rodov was not eligible for 
asylum, and concluded that he had not identified any error in the 
immigration judge’s evaluation of his CAT arguments.  The 
BIA thus denied Rodov’s alternative grounds for relief and 
declined to remand the case for further consideration.   
Rodov petitioned for our review. 
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II 
A 
Upon Rodov’s arrival at the border in 2007, DHS 
purported to parole him for prosecution.  The parole statute, 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), reads (emphasis added): 
The Attorney General may, except as provided in 
subparagraph (B) or in section 1184(f) of this 
title, in his discretion parole into the United States 
temporarily under such conditions as he may 
prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent 
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit 
any alien applying for admission to the United 
States, but such parole of such alien shall not be 
regarded as an admission of the alien and when 
the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion 
of the Attorney General, have been served the 
alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the 
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter 
his case shall continue to be dealt with in the 
same manner as that of any other applicant for 
admission to the United States. 
By its plain terms, this enactment grants the Attorney General 
the authority to parole only an “alien applying for admission to 
the United States.”  At the time he sought entry, however, 
Rodov had already been admitted to the country as a lawful 
permanent resident.  As such, he was presumptively not to be 
treated as an “alien applying for admission” (meaning that the 
7 
 
Attorney General presumptively lacked the statutory authority to 
parole him), because 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) provides that 
“[a]n alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the 
United States shall not be regarded as seeking an admission into 
the United States for purposes of the immigration laws unless” 
one of several conditions is met.1
                                                 
1 In the instant proceeding, DHS seeks Rodov’s removal 
because he is inadmissible—another action that the government is not 
ordinarily empowered to take against a lawfully admitted permanent 
resident.  See Toro-Romero v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 930, 936 (9th Cir. 
2004) (noting the distinction between aliens who are inadmissible 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, and those who are admitted but deportable 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227).  Thus the entirety of this proceeding is 
premised on the notion that Rodov has been an “alien applying for 
admission” since his last, fateful attempt to enter the country.   
  (We treat as synonymous 
“alien applying for admission,” “alien . . . seeking an 
admission,” and  similar terms.) 
Our dissenting colleague agrees that we should deny the 
petition seeking cancellation of removal, but we do not fully 
understand her reasoning.  Assuming arguendo that she is correct and 
that the immigration official at the border possessed insufficient 
evidence to conclude that Rodov had “committed” his offense at the 
time he sought reentry, then he should have been freely admitted 
rather than paroled.  To remove him after his conviction, DHS would 
have been required to initiate deportation proceedings, which it has 
not done.  All we have is an inadmissibility proceeding, which is 
invalid in toto if Rodov is an admitted lawful permanent resident.  
Thus if she is correct about the construction of the word “committed,” 
we think our colleague ought to argue that the entire removal 
proceeding should be declared void—at which point DHS could 
immediately seek Rodov’s deportation in a separate removal action.   
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Of those conditions, only the fifth is potentially 
applicable.  With exceptions not relevant here, it allows the 
government to regard a lawful permanent resident as an “alien . . 
. seeking an admission” if he “has committed an offense 
identified in [8 U.S.C. §] 1182(a)(2).”2
  Rodov argues that DHS cannot have made such a 
determination without a record of a conviction.  Because there 
 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(13)(C)(v).  Whether or not Rodov could be paroled thus 
depended on whether he had “committed” an enumerated crime 
at the time the government sought to parole him.  The 
government must have made its decision on this question at the 
border, for due process would have prohibited it from stripping 
a lawful permanent resident of his protected status at that time 
and only determining that its action was legally permitted at 
some later date.  DHS’s representatives were therefore required 
to determine whether or not there was adequate evidence that 
Rodov had “committed” his crime when he arrived at his point 
of entry, well before he had been convicted, or even formally 
charged.  
                                                 
2 There can be no dispute that the crime for which Rodov was 
under investigation (and of which he was later convicted) is one of 
those identified in § 1182(a)(2).  That section specifies, inter alia, 
“crimes involving moral turpitude” as one of several criminal grounds 
for a declaration of inadmissibility, and fraud is universally 
recognized as being such a crime.  See, e.g., Jordan v. De George, 
341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951) (“Whatever else the phrase ‘crime 
involving moral turpitude’ may mean in peripheral cases, the decided 
cases make it plain that crimes in which fraud was an ingredient have 
always been regarded as involving moral turpitude.”); Ghani v. 
Holder, 557 F.3d 836, 840 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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was no such record, he says, DHS cannot have validly regarded 
him as an applicant for admission, and was instead required to 
admit him into the country without strings attached.  The 
problem with this argument is that subsection (v) does not say 
“convicted.” The choice of the word “committed,” rather than 
“convicted,” is significant.3
It seems likely that Congress had in mind situations akin 
to that which is now before the court when it wrote the statute.  
A permanent resident who has been convicted of one of the 
enumerated crimes has probably already lost his “lawful” status 
as a consequence (the criminal grounds for inadmissibility listed 
in § 1182(a)(2) parallel the criminal grounds for deportability 
under § 1227(a)(2)(A)), so a statute permitting the state to 
regard him accordingly would be redundant.  In addition, 
subsection (iii)—covering aliens who have “engaged in illegal 
  Had Congress wished to require a 
conviction (a term it took some care to define, see 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(48)), it would have said so.  Note, for instance, that 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) acknowledges the distinctions 
between an alien who has been “convicted of” an offense, one 
“who admits having committed” an offense, and one “who 
admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements 
of” an offense.  Section 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) also demonstrates that 
Congress could have chosen a broad but precise phrase like “any 
alien convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who 
admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements 
of,” if it had wished to do so.  It instead selected “committed,” a 
distinct term in need of construction.   
                                                 
3 The legislative history does not explain the choice.  See S. 
Rep. No. 82-1137, at 4 (1952). 
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activity after having departed the United States”—parallels 
subsection (v) and clearly does not require a conviction.  The 
choice of “committed” is of a piece with the choice of “engaged 
in.”  Seen in this light, the statute’s text indicates that the 
government is not required to show a conviction. 
The question then becomes:  What sort of showing must 
be made before the government may conclude, for purposes of a 
parole determination, that an alien has “committed” a crime, 
and, accordingly, regard him as an applicant for admission?  The 
word “committed” does not contain or imply a burden of proof: 
“to commit” means only “to perpetrate”; a “commission” is “the 
act of doing or perpetrating.”  Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 
2009).  The word describes only historical events, and does not 
say anything about what evidence exists or what a third party 
knows.   
The balance of the statute does not specify either who 
bears the burden of proof, or how heavy that burden is.  The 
Immigration and Nationality Act contains a section concerning 
burdens of proof at removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c), 
but it is not helpful.  Subsection (c)(2)(B) provides that an alien 
claiming lawful permanent resident status has the burden of 
proving, “by clear and convincing evidence, that [he] is lawfully 
present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission,” but 
there is no dispute that Rodov fit that description at the time he 
attempted to reenter the country.  Subsection (c)(2)(A) provides 
that an applicant must establish, “clearly and beyond doubt,” 
that he is entitled to admission, but this does not apply to the 
predicate question of whether the alien is an applicant.   While 
we suppose that it could be argued that one of these subsections 
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should apply here, absent an explicit textual basis we will not 
require a person to prove that he has not committed an offense 
in order to ensure that he is treated in a manner consistent with 
his lawful permanent resident status—particularly since the 
preamble to § 1101(a)(13)(C) indicates that a permanent 
resident is presumptively to be regarded as such.   
Another subpart of the burden-of-proof statute, § 
1229a(c)(3)(A), directs that “the Service has the burden of 
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of 
an alien who has been admitted to the United States, the alien is 
deportable.”  This section too is not by its text applicable here: 
the question is not whether Rodov is deportable, but whether he 
should have been treated as an “alien who has been admitted to 
the United States” when he sought to enter the country.  
Subsection (c)(3)(B) lists several documents that the 
government may use to prove that an alien has been convicted of 
a crime, but as explained above we do not think that the statute 
requires that a conviction be proved.  
There is a hole in the Immigration and Naturalization 
Act: it requires an immigration officer to determine whether an 
arriving lawful permanent resident has committed a crime, but 
omits mention of how the officer is to do so. Obviously, some 
burden of proof must be met, and we think it necessary to 
prescribe one  as a matter of federal common law.  “A federal 
court has the power ‘to declare, as a matter of common law or 
‘judicial legislation,’ rules which may be necessary to fill in 
interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns 
enacted in the large by Congress.’” Cunningham v. R.R. Ret. 
Bd., 392 F.3d 567, 575 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. 
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Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973)).  To our 
knowledge, no other federal court of appeals has addressed this 
question, so we are left to infer the correct rule from the 
statute’s purposes, understood in light of general legal 
principles.  One such principle, suggested above, is that a party 
is not ordinarily required to prove a negative: we do not think 
that an alien should have to present evidence that he has not 
committed a crime in order to avert adverse government action.  
The burden thus must be on the government.  But how heavy is 
it?  Here we are informed by the legislatively and 
administratively prescribed procedure.  The initial decision 
whether to treat a permanent resident as an alien seeking 
admission is made by an immigration officer working at the 
alien’s point of arrival in the country.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
1235.3(b)(5)(ii).  There is no hearing, and no neutral arbiter who 
can be entrusted to assess whether the available evidence is 
sufficient to satisfy a “preponderance” or “clear and convincing” 
standard.  An elevated standard would also invite a comparison 
of the government’s evidence against that proffered by the alien-
defendant; but a person who has not been charged, and who may 
not even be aware that he is the subject of a criminal 
investigation, will not have had the opportunity to retain counsel 
or develop a defense.  And one of the purposes of the provision 
allowing an arriving permanent resident to be treated as an 
applicant for admission appears to have been to permit the 
government to invoke procedures like § 1182(d)(5) parole—
including parole for purposes of prosecution.  Requiring that the 
government develop evidence sufficient to win its case before it 
can take the step of paroling a person for prosecution would 
make little sense.   
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At the same time, revoking a person’s lawful-resident 
status entails restraints on the rights and privileges that he had 
previously enjoyed.  General due process principles therefore 
counsel that something more than an immigration officer’s say-
so must be required. With that in mind, we think the proper 
standard to employ here is probable cause to believe that the 
alien has committed one of the crimes identified in 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(2).  Ordinary procedures, familiar to anyone with a 
passing knowledge of criminal law and procedure, should be 
followed in determining whether probable cause exists:  Where 
a warrant has issued for the alien’s arrest on suspicion of the 
commission of one of the enumerated crimes, probable cause 
will be presumed.  Where such a warrant has not issued, 
treatment of the arriving alien as an applicant for admission 
rather than as a permanent resident will be contingent on a 
judge’s (or a magistrate’s) assessment of the proffered basis for 
believing probable cause to exist.  And, of course, if it becomes 
apparent at some later point that probable cause no longer exists, 
the government may no longer “regard[]” the lawful permanent 
resident as an applicant for admission.  Cf., e.g., Cannon v. 
Macon Cnty., 1 F.3d 1558, 1563 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a 
detainee has a constitutional right to be released from 
confinement “after it was or should have been known that [he] 
was entitled to release”). 
 It follows from this holding that, at the time Rodov 
sought re-entry into the United States, the government possessed 
sufficient evidence to establish that he had  “committed” the 
crime of aiding and abetting wire fraud for purposes of § 
1182(a)(13)(C)(v).  There was by that time an outstanding 
warrant for Rodov’s arrest, and he has never challenged its 
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validity—thus implicitly conceding that probable cause existed.4
Although we have reached the result sought by the 
government, we believe it necessary to consider the position that 
the Attorney General has advanced in his briefing and at oral 
argument.  According to the government, there is no need for us 
to concern ourselves with the burden-of-proof question, because 
DHS was permitted to parole Rodov into the country for 
prosecution irrespective of whether he is an alien seeking 
 
 Accordingly, DHS was permitted to regard him as an applicant 
for admission, to parole him for purposes of prosecution, and to 
seek his removal as an inadmissible alien (rather than as a 
deportable permanent resident). 
                                                 
4 Contra our colleague’s suggestion, an unchallenged and 
presumptively valid arrest warrant certainly does imply the existence 
of “some evidence that the crime has taken place.”  Post, at 9 
(emphasis removed).  A warrant issues only when a “neutral and 
detached magistrate” is satisfied that probable cause exists, Johnson 
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), which means that he has 
been shown evidence “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in 
believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an 
offense.”  Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964).  See also, e.g., 
Schneyder v. Smith, --- F.3d ---, 2011 WL 3211504, *7 (3d Cir. July 
29, 2011) (“For probable cause to exist, the evidence available must 
provide police or the warrant-issuing magistrate with reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested is guilty of a 
crime.”).  Although the immigration official who paroled Rodov into 
the country probably did not have before him all of the evidence with 
which the government established probable cause to believe that he 
had aided and abetted wire fraud, the arrest warrant was more than a 
sufficient proxy.  
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admission or a lawful permanent resident.  And because the 
decision to parole an alien is, according to the Attorney General, 
committed to his essentially unreviewable discretion, we lack 
jurisdiction to review his decision.  If this were true, counsel’s 
infelicitous description of parole as a legal “black hole” from 
which there is no prospect of escape except through an act of 
executive grace would be fairly accurate—though it might also 
be subject to serious due process challenge.  But for reasons 
suggested above, the government’s position is quite obviously 
contrary to the plain language of the statutes that are in play 
here.  Section 1182(d)(5)(A) grants discretion to order parole 
only of “alien[s] applying for admission to the United States,” 
and § 1101(a)(13)(C) provides that a lawful permanent resident 
“shall not be regarded as seeking an admission” unless one of 
several conditions (including commission of a designated 
offense) is met.  The Attorney General is not empowered to 
finally decide whether any of those six prerequisites is satisfied. 
Whether one of them has been established is a legal question 
subject to our review in the same manner as other analogous 
determinations—for instance, if Rodov had contested the issue, 
we would have assessed the probable cause question just as 
though this were a criminal appeal.  Because the statutes do not 
grant the Attorney General discretion regarding parole unless 
and until one of the conditions enumerated in § 1101(a)(13)(C) 
is satisfied, his claim that we are without jurisdiction to review 
this predicate issue rings hollow.   
The government cites two BIA decisions, In re 
Badalamenti, 19 I. & N. Dec. 623, 626 (B.I.A. 1988), and In re 
Accardi, 14 I. & N. Dec. 367, 368–69 (B.I.A. 1973), for the 
proposition that parole is not limited to applicants for admission. 
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Although the BIA’s interpretation of a statute within its 
enforcement jurisdiction is entitled to Chevron deference, see 
En Hui Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010), 
that rule of interpretation does not apply unless the statute is 
ambiguous.  Roth v. Norfalco LLC, --- F.3d --- (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).  Whatever the merits of the BIA’s 
interpretation as regards Messrs. Badalamenti and Accardi 
(neither was a citizen or lawful permanent resident; both had 
been brought to the country involuntarily for the specific 
purpose of prosecution), it unambiguously does not have any 
application to a person in Rodov’s position, whose rights as a 
permanent resident had vested subject only to a limited set of 
conditions.  The Attorney General’s effort to dodge the burden-
of-proof issue is thus futile, and counsel’s conspicuous decision 
not to address it (despite the fact that Rodov raised it in his 
opening brief, at 43–46) has left us with access to only one side 
of the argument.  Suffice it to say that the government has not 
been helpful. 
B 
 Rodov next argues that the government should be 
equitably estopped from treating him as an arriving alien, even if 
the statutes permit it.  Although labeled “estoppel,” this claim is 
really in the nature of a due process complaint.  See Rodov Br. 
54 (“The petitioner submits that [the equitable estoppel] 
requirements should not be applied in the case at bar because the 
nature of his due process/equitable estoppel claim does not 
relate to an affirmative misrepresentation made by the 
Government, as is often done, but instead relates to procedural 
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manipulation by the Government to make removal of the 
petitioner easier.”).  In support, Rodov cites Doggett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647, 656 (1992), and United States v. Marion, 
404 U.S. 307, 324 (1971), for the notion that the government 
cannot manipulate procedure to gain a tactical advantage in 
litigation.  In both of those cases, the government conceded that 
intentional, bad-faith, and prejudicial delays in moving forward 
with a prosecution would implicate constitutional guarantees.  
Neither case is directly applicable here (Rodov’s argument 
concerns not delays but the statutorily-authorized decision to 
treat him as an applicant for admission), and Rodov has not 
presented a compelling case for the fairly extravagant 
interpretation of their holdings that he wishes us to adopt.  At 
least in the absence of an argument more substantial than those 
with which we are today presented, we cannot conclude that the 
Attorney General’s invocation of statutorily-authorized 
procedural devices violates the Due Process Clause.   
III 
Having concluded that Rodov was properly regarded as 
an applicant for admission, we now turn to the merits of the 
BIA’s order that he be removed from the country as an 
inadmissible alien.  The primary question here is whether the 
crime to which Rodov pled guilty is an “aggravated felony” for 
purposes of the immigration laws.  If so, Rodov is ineligible to 
have his removal cancelled, and the BIA’s reversal of the 
immigration judge’s cancellation order must be affirmed.  
Because Rodov’s offense (aiding and abetting wire fraud) 
clearly “involves fraud or deceit,” it qualifies as an “aggravated 
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felony” if “the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i).   
The usual approach to deciding whether a crime is an 
aggravated felony is to look only at the elements and nature of 
the offense in question, without considering the particular facts 
underlying the conviction.  See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 7 
(2004).  But “where, as here, ‘a statute criminalizes different 
kinds of conduct, some of which would constitute [aggravated 
felonies] while others would not, the court must apply a 
modified categorical approach by which a court may look 
beyond the statutory elements to determine” whether the alien 
was actually convicted of an aggravated felony.  Restrepo v. 
Att’y Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 2010)) (alteration 
in original); Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294, 2302 (2009)). 
The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, makes no distinctions 
on the basis of the amount of loss, so we must look to the 
specific facts of this case to determine whether the relevant loss 
amount exceeds the $10,000 threshold.  Rodov argues that his 
crime does not clear this bar, because the plea agreement 
specifically identifies as the basis for his conviction only a 
single specific transaction in the amount of $6,447.  The 
government responds by pointing out that the plea agreement 
stipulated that Rodov was personally responsible for causing a 
loss of more than $120,000.   
We agree in principle with Rodov’s assertion that a court 
assessing whether a felony is aggravated must limit itself to 
consideration of “the loss ‘tethered’ to the alien’s specific 
offense of conviction.”  Rodov Br. 29–30 (citing Alaka v. Att’y 
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Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 105–07 (3d Cir. 2006); Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. 
at 2303).  Indeed, that rule is dictated by Alaka, a case in which 
the petitioning alien had pled guilty to one of three counts of 
aiding and abetting bank fraud.  Although the overall scheme 
caused a total of $47,969 in losses, the guilty plea identified just 
a single act—with respect to which the loss was only $4,716.68. 
See 456 F.3d at 92, 107.  Focusing on the particular contents of 
the plea agreement (rather than the indictment or the sentence), 
we held that “it was legal error for the IJ to consider the amount 
of intended loss for all of the charges rather than the single 
count for which she was convicted.”  Id. at 106.   
We then noted the possible existence of an “exception to 
the strict emphasis on the plea agreement,” id. at 108, arising out 
of the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Khalayleh v. INS, 287 F.3d 978 
(10th Cir. 2002).  That case involved a resident alien who had 
pled guilty to one count of a four-count indictment alleging the 
use of four insufficient-funds checks to defraud a bank.  The 
specific count to which he pled guilty involved a check in the 
amount of $9,308, but the total actual loss resulting from the 
four checks exceeded $24,000.  The Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged that if each of the counts had been a distinct 
crime, the petitioner would have been able to argue that only the 
one giving rise to the guilty plea was relevant to the 
determination of whether his felony was aggravated.  Id. at 980. 
The court concluded, however, that: 
Count Two of the indictment did not allege a 
discrete fraud involving only the $9,308 check.  It 
alleged a scheme to defraud that encompassed a 
number of checks. . . .  The “offense” of 
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conviction was the entire scheme charged in 
Count Two of the indictment.  Hence, the “loss” 
to be measured is the loss resulting from that 
scheme. 
Id.  Because it was the overall scheme that mattered, and not the 
individual check, the court counted the entire $24,000 loss 
amount and concluded that the crime in question was an 
aggravated felony.  Id.   
While the Alaka panel described the Tenth Circuit’s 
approach, we did not express an opinion on its merits.  We did 
not address the question whether Alaka’s crimes were all part of 
a common scheme, though we did state that our holding was 
“not affected by the District Court’s conclusion, for sentencing 
purposes, that Alaka’s conduct as to the dismissed charges was 
‘part of a common scheme or plan as the offense of 
conviction.’”  456 F.3d at 108.   
This case does not require us to consider whether 
Khalayleh’s approach is the law of this circuit.  Rodov did not 
plead guilty to a single discrete act of accepting a $6,447 
transfer. He admitted to aiding and abetting the entire scheme.  
In the section of his plea agreement discussing the nature and 
elements of his offense, Rodov admitted to knowingly and 
intentionally aiding and abetting a plan to obtain money via 
fraudulent pretenses, using the interstate wires.  That section 
makes no mention of any specific transaction: it refers to the 
entire scheme as the underlying crime which Rodov admitted to 
aiding and abetting.  Furthermore, the “Stipulation of Offense 
Conduct” specifies that Rodov aided and abetted the fraud by 
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“opening several bank accounts in his personal name with local 
banking institutions,” into which John Doe caused a number of 
fraudulent tax refunds to be deposited. And, of course, the 
stipulation also indicates that Rodov’s conduct caused between 
$120,000 and $200,000 in losses.  Taking these terms of the plea 
agreement together, it is plain that Rodov was convicted of 
aiding and abetting the entire fraudulent scheme.  His admitted 
participation was not limited to one $6,447 deposit; that 
transaction appears to the court to have been included in the plea 
agreement to establish the “use of the interstate wires” element 
of the underlying offense.  Because Rodov pled guilty not to a 
single fraudulent transaction but to aiding and abetting the 
whole of a large-scale criminal endeavor, there is no need to 
decide whether conduct outside the specific offense of 
conviction can be pertinent to the aggravated felony 
determination.  Rodov was in fact convicted of committing all of 
the relevant conduct.  The BIA’s conclusion that his crime 
constituted an aggravated felony was correct. 
IV 
 Rodov’s final argument to the immigration judge was 
that he is entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, and 
protection under the Convention Against Torture.  Because the 
immigration judge (erroneously, as it turns out) granted his 
request for cancellation of removal on other grounds, there was 
no need for him to address the CAT questions.  The court 
nevertheless stated “as an aside” that, “if it were to consider the 
respondent’s application for asylum it would deny that 
application,” as well as the request for withholding of removal 
under the CAT.  The BIA correctly reversed the immigration 
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judge’s cancellation of Rodov’s removal on the basis of his 
conviction of an aggravated felony, and then went on to reject 
his contentions under the CAT.  On appeal to this court, Rodov 
argues that the BIA should have remanded his case to the 
immigration judge for a decision on his CAT arguments.   
 Given the immigration judge’s prior statements, Rodov’s 
CAT requests are likely to go unfulfilled.  However, we must 
conclude that proper procedure requires us to remand the case to 
the immigration judge.  The BIA’s jurisdiction is limited to 
“[d]ecisions,” see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b), and the immigration 
judge explicitly did not decide the CAT questions, see App. 162, 
339–40.  Thus the BIA lacked jurisdiction to address Rodov’s 
CAT arguments, and the case must be remanded so that the 
immigration judge can address them in the first instance. 
V 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will deny the petition 
for review in part, affirming the BIA’s decision in all respects 
except with regard to Rodov’s CAT claims.  We will grant the 
petition with respect to the BIA’s statements concerning the 
CAT, vacating those statements insofar as they constitute an 
order.  We will remand the case to the immigration court for the 
limited purpose of deciding the CAT questions. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge – concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
 
I. 
 
I agree with the majority’s rulings on most of the 
issues in this appeal, including its decision to affirm the 
BIA’s denial of Rodov’s application for asylum and 
withholding of removal, and to remand the case to the 
immigration judge to decide whether Rodov is entitled to 
protection under the Convention Against Torture.  In 
particular, I agree with the majority’s analysis of the statutory 
provisions governing the timing of the immigration officials’ 
determination of whether a returning lawful permanent 
resident (“LPR”) has “committed” an offense.  However, I 
cannot agree with the majority’s view as to what that 
determination should be based on.  The majority concludes 
that, for the purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v), the 
mere existence of an arrest warrant was sufficient to establish 
that Rodov had “committed” the relevant offense.  In so 
concluding, the majority disregards the true meaning of the 
term, “committed,” and improperly lowers the bar regarding 
the evidence needed for officials at the point of entry to find 
that Rodov “committed” a crime.1
                                              
1The BIA failed entirely to grapple with this issue, concluding 
without analysis that, because Rodov later pled guilty to a 
fraud offense, he had “committed” that offense at the time he 
sought admission to the United States.   
  This is a significant issue 
of first impression and an important one for returning LPRs.  
While probable cause for an arrest warrant may be sufficient 
to show the likelihood of commission, it does not provide any 
proof whatsoever that the alien has indeed committed an 
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offense.  I think that more is required to establish commission 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) than probable cause to 
believe an alien has committed an offense.  Therefore, I 
respectfully dissent in part from the majority’s opinion.   
 
Given this, I would reason through the analysis as 
follows.  First, it was improper for the Government to regard 
Rodov as an applicant for admission at the time he sought 
reentry because, at that point, there was no evidence 
whatsoever—and no admission by Rodov—that he had 
“committed” an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2).  Thus, under 
§ 1101(a)(13)(C), Rodov, an “alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence,” should not have been regarded as an 
“applicant for admission” when he reentered the United 
States in 2007, and should not have been paroled.  If Rodov 
was not seeking admission, then, under 8 U.S.C. § 1227, he 
should have been permitted to enter as an LPR.   
 
In order to remove him from the country, the 
Government would have to show that he was deportable for a 
reason other than “inadmissib[ility] at the time of entry or of 
adjustment of status.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1).  After Rodov 
was convicted of aiding and abetting wire fraud in January 
2009, the DHS could have issued a Notice to Appear 
(“NTA”) charging him as an LPR who was deportable under 
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), which 
provides that “[a]ny alien convicted of an aggravated felony 
at any time after admission is deportable.”  The DHS did 
properly find that, because Rodov’s crime constituted an 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i), he 
was not statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal.  
Accordingly, were DHS to bring deportation proceedings 
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against him, it would most likely determine him to be 
deportable.  However, he cannot be excluded as inadmissible.   
 
For the reasons set forth below, however, I disagree 
with respect to the majority’s holding as to the threshold issue 
it addresses, namely, whether officials at the point of entry 
had a sufficient basis for concluding that he had committed an 
offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v).  I suggest that 
they did not.           
 
II. 
 
As the majority explains, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) 
states that a returning LPR who has “committed” a crime 
identified in § 1182(a)(2), including a crime involving moral 
turpitude, should be considered an applicant for admission 
and thus subject to the various grounds of inadmissibility 
included in 8 U.S.C. § 1182.  Under the majority’s reading, 
the determination that a returning LPR has “committed” a 
crime of moral turpitude can be based on the entry officials’ 
knowledge that there is an outstanding arrest warrant 
charging him with such a crime.  Because of the lack of 
existing caselaw on this issue, the majority establishes this as 
a “matter of federal common law.”  (Maj. Op. 11).  See 
Cunningham v. R.R. Ret. Bd., 329 F.3d 567, 575 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“A federal court has the power to declare, as a matter 
of common law or judicial legislation, rules which may be 
necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the 
statutory patterns enacted in large by Congress.”) (internal 
citation and quotation marks omitted) (quoted in Maj. Op. 
11)).  In sua sponte setting forth a rule as to the sufficiency of 
the evidence for a finding that someone has “committed” a 
crime under subsection (v), the majority does little more than 
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ruminate on what standard it thinks is the most fair.  As the 
majority itself acknowledges, its reading of subsection (v) 
assigns the immigration officer stationed at an LPR’s point of 
arrival responsibility for determining whether the alien should 
be stripped of his LPR status and treated as an applicant for 
admission, or should be admitted and processed as an LPR.2  
The lack of due process in such a system,3 the majority 
asserts, calls for a lower burden of proof in determining 
whether an LPR has “committed” a crime.  Not too low, 
however, because “[g]eneral due process principles . . . 
counsel that something more than an immigration officer’s 
say-so must be required.”  (Maj. Op. 13).  Striking a 
compromise between two extremes—a conviction 
requirement, on the one hand, and an immigration officer’s 
independent assessment, on the other—the majority settles on 
probable cause as the appropriate standard.4
                                              
2See Maj. Op. 13 (acknowledging that an immigration 
officer’s determination at the point of entry that an LPR has 
committed a crime of moral turpitude “revok[es] . . . [that] 
person’s lawful-resident status,” and, thus, “entails restraints 
on the rights and privileges that he had previously enjoyed.”).  
     
 
3As the majority points out, when an immigration officer 
determines an alien’s admissibility status at the point of entry, 
“[t]here is no hearing, and no neutral arbiter who can be 
entrusted to assess whether the available evidence is 
sufficient to satisfy a ‘preponderance’ or ‘clear and 
convincing’ standard.”  (Maj. Op. 12).    
 
4See Maj. Op. 13 (“With [general due process principles] in 
mind, we think the proper standard to employ here is probable 
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Neither the majority, nor the BIA in the opinion from 
which Rodov has appealed, offers support for the conclusion 
that the existence of an arrest warrant, presumably based on 
probable cause, is sufficient to establish “commission” of a 
crime for the purposes of subsection (v).  While the majority 
is correct that other Courts of Appeals have not addressed this 
exact question, I do not think that the absence of precise 
authority on the question merits our formulation of a new, 
substantive rule of federal common law.  See Carley v. 
Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1128-29 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(noting the “well-established principle that rules of federal 
common law should be narrowly drawn and imposed only in 
rare circumstances where there is a ‘significant conflict’ 
between a federal interest and the application of state law”); 
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 
641 (1981) (“Absent some congressional authorization to 
formulate substantive rules of decision, federal common law 
exists only in such narrow areas as those concerned with the 
rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and 
international disputes implicating the conflicting rights of 
States or our relations with foreign nations, and admiralty 
cases.”).   
 
Not only is the promulgation of such a rule uncalled 
for, it is actually in conflict with relevant authority as to what 
is necessary to prove “commission” of an offense.  Existing 
caselaw supports the view that more than just probable cause 
is needed to find that an alien or LPR has “committed” an 
offense.  See De Vega v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 
                                                                                                     
cause to believe that the alien has committed one of the 
crimes identified in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).”).  
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2007) (“The relevant category for this case covers LPRs who 
have ‘committed an offense identified in section 1182(a)(2),’ 
meaning those LPRs who have been convicted of, ‘or who 
admit[ ] having committed, or who admit[ ] committing acts 
which constitute the essential elements of,’ a crime involving 
moral turpitude.”) (internal citations omitted)).5
                                              
5In other cases where LPRs have been regarded as “seeking 
admission” and found inadmissible due to having committed 
crimes of moral turpitude, they had been convicted of a crime 
or did not challenge the “seeking admission” designation.  
See, e.g., Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 92 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(at the time she reentered, petitioner had been convicted in the 
U.S. for aiding and abetting bank fraud); Nadal-Ginard v. 
Holder, 558 F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2009) (at the time of 
attempted reentry, petitioner had been convicted of four 
counts of larceny); Singh v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 526 
F.3d 72, 76 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008) (the court noted that Singh, 
who was found to be inadmissible for committing a crime of 
moral turpitude, “was convicted of his offense after he had 
applied for admission,” but, because he “does not rely on this 
fact as a possible ground for challenging the inadmissibility 
ruling . . . any argument to that effect is waived, and we do 
not address it.”).  But see Oduko v. Immigration & 
Naturalization Serv., 2008 WL 1925042 (2d Cir. Apr. 30, 
2008).  In Oduku, an unpublished opinion, the Second Circuit 
ruled that petitioner could properly be regarded as having 
“committed” a crime of moral turpitude when, at the time of 
his attempted reentry, he had been indicted, but not convicted, 
of criminal possession of stolen property.  Id. at *1.  The 
Second Circuit explained, briefly:  “Here, the BIA's 
interpretation of § 101(a)(13)(C) is reasonable as Congress 
selected the term ‘committed’ rather than the term 
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The majority correctly draws attention to the choice of 
the word “committed,”  instead of “convicted,” in subsection 
(v); clearly, “commission” of an offense includes a broader 
category of acts than only “conviction.”  However, as De 
Vega suggests, it is reasonable to read § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v)’s 
language—“committed  an offense identified in section 
1182(a)(2)”—as encompassing the behavior specifically 
identified in  § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I):  conviction of, admission 
of committing, or admission of committing essential elements 
of, a crime involving moral turpitude.  See De Vega, 503 F.3d 
at 47.  It makes sense to use “committed” rather than 
“convicted” in order to include offenses for which aliens have 
not been convicted, but which they have admitted to 
committing. 
 
The use, and interpretation in the caselaw, of the word 
“committed” in sentencing statutes also supports this reading.  
When sentencing statutes use the word “committed,” we are 
to consider not only the elements of the offense but also 
underlying facts and conduct to see if they establish, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that defendant committed an 
offense, even if he was not convicted for that offense.  In 
United States v. Mi Kyung Byun, 539 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 
                                                                                                     
‘convicted.’ . . . Because Oduko committed the offense 
involving moral turpitude prior to his attempted reentry, he 
came under the exception in INA § 101(a)(13)(C) and was 
properly treated as an arriving alien.”  Id. at *2 (internal 
citations omitted).  However, this authority does not bind us 
and, even if it did, the circumstances are distinguishable 
because indictment for a crime requires a higher level of 
proof than the mere issuance of an arrest warrant.   
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2008), for example, the court was called on to interpret 18 
U.S.C. § 2423, which criminalizes transportation of minors 
with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, focusing on 
the phrase, “when committed against a minor.”  Id. at 985 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2423) (emphasis added).  The Ninth 
Circuit explained that the “use of the word ‘committed,’ 
rather than ‘convicted’ persuasively indicates that, in 
determining whether the victim of Byun’s crime was a minor, 
we may consider not only the elements of the crime of which 
Byun was convicted but her actual conduct.”  Id. at 991.  See 
also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) 
(noting that the use of “convicted” instead of “committed” in 
18 U.S.C. § 924, which provides a sentencing enhancement 
for a defendant convicted of unlawful possession who has 
three prior convictions for violent felonies, indicates that 
Congress intended the sentencing court to look to the crimes 
for which defendant was convicted, “not to the facts 
underlying the prior convictions.”).           
 
In United States v. Charlesworth, 217 F.3d 1155, 
1159-60 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit addressed the 
question of whether a sentencing judge properly denied the 
four-level reduction in U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1, which provides 
penalties for escape and instigating or assisting escape from a 
prison, based on evidence that a defendant “committed” a 
felony.  The Ninth Circuit, noting that the term “committed” 
should be given its plain meaning, explained that the “use of 
the word ‘committed’ . . . suggests that neither a conviction 
for a felony nor even an indictment is required.”  Id. at 1159.  
Rather, the court noted that proof of “uncharged facts or 
conduct” that have been established by a preponderance of 
the evidence “is sufficient to establish that the defendant 
committed a felony in order to preclude the reduction of the 
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sentence under § 2P1.1(b)(3).”  Id.  See also United States v. 
Strachan, 968 F.2d 1161, 1162-63 (11th Cir. 1992) (noting 
that, because the sentencing guidelines do not define 
“committed,” it must be given its ordinary meaning, and 
holding that a district court can deny the reduction under  
§ 2P1.1(b)(3) “if a preponderance of the evidence 
demonstrates that the defendant committed a disqualifying 
offense, even if there has been no formal conviction.”); 
United States v. Durham, 178 F.2d 796, 799 (6th Cir. 1999) 
(assuming, without directly addressing the question, that § 
2P1.1(b)(3) requires neither a conviction nor an indictment in 
order to preclude application of the reduction).            
 
While, in interpreting “committed” in the immigration 
statute, we do not have the same preponderance standard in 
place, the treatment of the word “committed” in the 
sentencing context is still instructive.  It suggests that, if we 
give the word “committed” its plain meaning,6
                                              
6See United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 196 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“[T]he ‘plain meaning’ is our starting point.  We do 
not lightly disregard the statutory language.”) (citing 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 
U.S. 478, 482 (1992)). 
 it describes 
facts or conduct.  Perhaps those facts need not be established 
by a preponderance of evidence in all statutory contexts, but, 
at the time a person can be regarded as having “committed” a 
crime, there must be some evidence that the crime has taken 
place.  The majority equates the type of proof to “historical 
events.”  (Maj. Op. 10).  I agree.  Yet, probable cause for an 
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arrest does not constitute proof of historical events or the fact 
of commission.7
 
    
Even assuming it is appropriate to fashion federal 
common law here, I am still skeptical of the majority’s 
analysis.  To begin with, the definition of “probable cause” 
itself casts doubt on the majority’s interpretation.  Probable 
cause to arrest is present “when the facts and circumstances 
within the arresting officer’s knowledge [at the time of the 
arrest] are sufficient in themselves to warrant a reasonable 
person to believe that an offense has been or is being 
committed by the person to be arrested.”  Merkle v. Upper 
Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782, 788, 789 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Probable cause to arrest establishes that an officer believes 
that an offense has been committed; it is not proof that that 
the offense has actually been committed.  Importantly, the 
statute does not state that the determination is whether the 
LPR “may have” committed or even “probably” committed 
the offense.  The required finding is that he did commit the 
offense.  The existence of probable cause (assuming the 
warrant was so supported) is not proof that the crime was 
actually committed.8
                                              
7See also Black’s Law Dictionary, Entry on “Commission” 
(9th ed. 2009) (defining “commission” as “[t]he act of doing 
or perpetrating (as a crime).”).   
            
 
8 While the majority suggests that the Government should not 
have to develop evidence before paroling a person, (Maj. Op. 
12), the statute requires the Government to make a 
determination, and that determination must have an adequate 
basis in fact.  Surely they could ask him about the warrant or 
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In addition, it seems antithetical to the “general due 
process principles” cited by the majority itself that a 
determination of an alien’s or LPR’s status using a lowered 
burden of proof for commission occurs without any legal 
process whatsoever.  As noted above, even the majority 
acknowledges the absence of process and counsel, and the 
significance of the restraints resulting from the determination.  
If the absence of the availability of process at the point of 
entry means anything at all, it means that more definitive 
proof—evidence as to commission, admission, or 
conviction—is required for an immigration official to 
conclude that someone has “committed” a crime.  The 
majority misunderstands what a heightened standard—one 
requiring, for example, conviction or admission—would 
mean in practice.  It would not necessitate “a comparison,” 
presumably conducted by the immigration official at the point 
of entry, “of the government’s evidence against that proffered 
by the alien-defendant.”  (Maj. Op. 12).  To the contrary, the 
immigration official could only deem an LPR to be “seeking 
admission,” and thus subject to being paroled when he has 
some evidence that the LPR actually committed a listed 
offense.   
 
Here, there were no statements by the petitioner, nor 
any facts known to the airport official that could be 
considered evidence that the petitioner had committed the 
crime charged.  Surely, the mere presence of an arrest warrant 
is not enough.    
  
 
                                                                                                     
get copy of it and follow up with some investigation before 
imposing restraints on him.   
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III. 
 
Ultimately, as noted above, I would reach the same 
result as the majority here—that Rodov cannot remain in the 
country unless he can prove his CAT claim—but I would 
reach this result on the basis that he is deportable under 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) because he was convicted of 
committing an aggravated felony.  I disagree with the 
majority’s conclusion that he was an applicant for admission 
upon reentry to the U.S. who was later deemed inadmissible 
when he was convicted of a crime of moral turpitude, because 
probable cause to believe he committed a crime of moral 
turpitude does not provide sufficient proof of “commission” 
so as to fulfill 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) and strip him of 
his LPR status.      
